What your four convertible instruments actually convert to — modeled across the three priced-round scenarios you're weighing, before you sign anything.
This document is built to be read in one sitting the week before your priced round, then handed to your lawyer and your co-founder. It moves in four arcs:
Pages 3–8. Your number, first. The as-converted snapshot, the three flags, and exactly what we modeled — so you can confirm we're working from your reality before you trust a single figure.
Pages 9–40. Section by section: the pro-forma cap table, how each instrument converts, the full waterfall, the stacking-warning map, and the market benchmark. Each opens with why this matters to you now and shows an INPUT→OUTPUT box mapping your inputs to that section's outputs.
Pages 41–58. The transformation: your before/after, the specific levers that move your number, a milestone timeline to a signed term sheet, and how your next lead conversation changes once you walk in with this.
Pages 59–70. A prioritized checklist (this week / 30 / 90 days), scripts you can send tomorrow, a one-page handoff sheet for your lawyer and CPA, and where deeper modeling makes sense.
Every major section carries a dashed box like the one below. It exists so you never wonder where a number came from: on the left is what you told us (your raw intake), on the right is what this section computed from it. This is your report; these boxes prove it.
Throughout, "post-money" without qualification means the priced round's post-money (pre-money + new money). "Post-money SAFE" refers to the YC Nov-2018 instrument convention. See the glossary on page 68.
You've raised $1.45M across four convertible instruments and none of it has converted yet. A lead has floated $18M pre-money. Here is the number nobody has put in front of you: what your prior stack becomes the moment that round prices.
That is a block worth roughly $3.3M at a $21.5M post-money — claimed by investors who wrote you $1.45M in checks, and it is fixed before your new lead's money lands. It is the single number the lead prices your pre-money against.
We modeled your exact stack across the three pre-money scenarios you're weighing. Founders + team land in a tight band; the prior stack barely moves; almost all the swing is the new money:
| Scenario | Post-money | Founders + team | Prior stack | New money |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear — $2.5M @ $12M pre | $14.5M | 57.19% | 16.14% | 16.67% |
| Base — $3.5M @ $18M pre | $21.5M | 58.72% | 15.37% | 15.91% |
| Bull — $4M @ $26M pre | $30.0M | 61.60% | 15.28% | 13.11% |
Before any analysis, here is what our warning engine surfaced the instant it read your four instruments. Two are working against you right now; one is a live unknown. Each is expanded in §4.
The $300K syndicate SAFE was signed at an $8M cap — but it carries an MFN clause, and your $500K lead angel's $6M cap is better. So the syndicate inherits the $6M cap. That single clause moves ~160,000 shares to the syndicate and drops founders roughly a full percentage point (§2, §4). You triggered it yourself the day you signed the lead's cheaper SAFE.
Post-money SAFE ownership is fixed as a % of the post-money cap table, so when you stack several, the percentages add and every point comes out of you, never out of another SAFE. Your prior stack is already ~15% of post before the round even prices.
The $400K bridge SAFE is uncapped, discount-only. Its dilution is invisible in a static cap table because it depends on a price you haven't set. It takes 3.33% in the bear case but only 1.64% in the bull — the one line that gets cheaper the higher you price (§4).
These are pattern flags computed from your inputs, not legal conclusions. MFN scope, side letters, and conversion triggers in your executed documents can change the outcome — confirm each against the signed originals with counsel.
So you can confirm we're working from your reality, here is the complete intake this entire report is built on. If any line is wrong, the report is wrong — check it first.
| Holder | Shares | % of existing |
|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 8,400,000 | 91.30% |
| Existing option pool + early employees | 800,000 | 8.70% |
| Total existing FD | 9,200,000 | 100.00% |
SAFEs and the note are not in this count — they are not yet shares. That is precisely why they're easy to under-count.
| Instrument | Type | Principal | Cap | Discount | MFN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 pre-seed SAFE (Lead angel) | Post-money SAFE | $500,000 | $6.0M | — | — |
| 2024 pre-seed SAFE (Angel syndicate) | Post-money SAFE | $300,000 | $8.0M | — | Yes |
| 2025 bridge SAFE | Post-money SAFE | $400,000 | uncapped | 20% | — |
| 2025 convertible note (angel) | Note · 6% · 14mo | $250,000 | $10.0M | — | — |
| Total invested | $1,450,000 |
| Scenario | New money | Pre-money | Target pool |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $2,500,000 | $12,000,000 | 10% |
| Base | $3,500,000 | $18,000,000 | 10% |
| Bull | $4,000,000 | $26,000,000 | 10% |
Assumptions: post-money SAFEs convert on the YC Nov-2018 convention (ownership fixed vs. post-money cap table; founders absorb the dilution). Note interest is 6% simple × 14/12 = $17,500, so it converts on $267,500. The new option pool is created in the pre-money (the "option-pool shuffle"). Currency USD throughout; no FX inferred. Full mechanics in §1–§3 and the methodology page.
One picture before the detailed sections. This is your base-case post-round company, by holder — the pie a lead sees when they open your data room. The two shaded bars are what you're paying us to make legible.
"My prior stack converts to 15.37% of the post-round company before my new lead's money — three of my four instruments are cap-locked and won't move whatever pre-money I negotiate, and one MFN clause is quietly costing me a full point."
If you internalize only that sentence, this report has paid for itself. It reframes your whole negotiation: you stop over-indexing on the pre-money number (which mostly trades off against the new investor) and start managing the block that's actually fixed — the MFN, the pool shuffle, the uncapped bridge.
Why this matters to you now: the associate asked for your "as-converted cap table across a couple of scenarios." This is that document — and it's the single artifact that tells the lead you understand your own round. Read across a row to see how your dilution moves with the pre-money you negotiate; read down a column to see who ends up owning what.
| Scenario | Post-money | Price/share | Founders | Prior stack | New $ | Pool |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear — $2.5M @ $12M pre | $14.5M | $0.9325 | 57.19% | 16.14% | 16.67% | 10.00% |
| Base — $3.5M @ $18M pre | $21.5M | $1.4042 | 58.72% | 15.37% | 15.91% | 10.00% |
| Bull — $4M @ $26M pre | $30.0M | $2.0422 | 61.60% | 15.28% | 13.11% | 10.00% |
"Founders" = founders + all existing holders (the 9,200,000 existing FD shares) as % of post-round FD. "Prior stack" = your four converted instruments combined. Every figure produced by the engine from your page-6 inputs; nothing estimated.
Your floor. If the market softens and you take the lowest pre-money you'd accept, this is your post-round company. Note the two effects that hurt you here: the new investor's share is largest (16.67%), and — critically — your uncapped bridge SAFE swells to 3.33% because a low round price makes its 20% discount bite harder.
| Holder | FD shares | Ownership |
|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 8,400,000 | 52.22% |
| Existing pool + team | 800,000 | 4.97% |
| New option pool | 1,608,579 | 10.00% |
| Lead angel SAFE | 1,072,386 | 6.67% |
| Syndicate SAFE (MFN) | 643,432 | 4.00% |
| Bridge SAFE (uncapped) | 536,193 | 3.33% |
| Convertible note | 344,236 | 2.14% |
| New investors | 2,680,965 | 16.67% |
| Total | 16,085,791 | 100.00% |
The scenario the lead has floated, and the one every other section defaults to. This is your most likely post-round company. Founders + team hold 58.72%; your prior stack is 15.37%; the new investor takes 15.91%.
| Holder | FD shares | Ownership |
|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 8,400,000 | 53.61% |
| Existing pool + team | 800,000 | 5.11% |
| New option pool | 1,566,745 | 10.00% |
| Lead angel SAFE | 1,068,235 | 6.82% |
| Syndicate SAFE (MFN) | 640,941 | 4.09% |
| Bridge SAFE (uncapped) | 356,078 | 2.27% |
| Convertible note | 342,904 | 2.19% |
| New investors | 2,492,549 | 15.91% |
| Total | 15,667,454 | 100.00% |
Your ceiling — a strong round with real competitive tension. Here the new investor's share falls to 13.11% and your bridge SAFE shrinks to 1.64%: pricing high is exactly when a discount-only instrument is cheapest to you. Founders + team reach 61.60%.
| Holder | FD shares | Ownership |
|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 8,400,000 | 56.24% |
| Existing pool + team | 800,000 | 5.36% |
| New option pool | 1,493,520 | 10.00% |
| Lead angel SAFE | 1,060,970 | 7.10% |
| Syndicate SAFE (MFN) | 636,582 | 4.26% |
| Bridge SAFE (uncapped) | 244,839 | 1.64% |
| Convertible note | 340,571 | 2.28% |
| New investors | 1,958,714 | 13.11% |
| Total | 14,935,197 | 100.00% |
Across all three scenarios the waterfall reconciles to 100.00% and the note always converts on $267,500 (principal + $17,500 simple interest). Per-instrument mechanics follow in §2.
Why this matters to you now: the pie in §1 hides the choices you made months ago that are cashing out today — which cap governed, whether a discount beat it, and where the MFN reached. This is the section your lawyer will read most closely. All figures are the base case ($18M pre); the summary table below, then one page per instrument.
| Instrument | Prin.+int. | Converts on | Price/sh | Shares | % of post |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead angel SAFE | $500,000 | Valuation cap | $0.4681 | 1,068,235 | 6.82% |
| Syndicate SAFE | $300,000 | MFN → $6M cap | $0.4681 | 640,941 | 4.09% |
| Bridge SAFE | $400,000 | Discount (20%) | $1.1233 | 356,078 | 2.27% |
| Convertible note | $267,500 | Valuation cap | $0.7801 | 342,904 | 2.19% |
| Prior stack | $1,467,500 | 2,408,158 | 15.37% |
"Converts on" is the rule that governed. An investor always takes whichever path yields more shares — i.e., the lower conversion price. Round price/share in the base case is $1.4042; every instrument below converts under that, which is the whole point of a cap or discount.
Your earliest and largest angel check, on a clean $6M post-money cap, no discount, no MFN. As a post-money SAFE, its ownership is set at signing as principal ÷ cap = $500,000 ÷ $6,000,000 = 8.33% of the post-money cap table (the company as it stands after all SAFEs convert but before the new money). "Fixed" here means fixed against that baseline — it is not a percentage the holder keeps through the round. Once the new money and the option pool are added, this SAFE dilutes further, exactly like every other holder: on the full post-round table it lands at 6.82%.
| Term | Value |
|---|---|
| Principal | $500,000 |
| Post-money cap | $6,000,000 |
| Cap-implied price/share | $0.4681 |
| Round price/share (base) | $1.4042 |
| Converts on | Cap (far below round price) |
| Shares | 1,068,235 |
| Ownership, post-round | 6.82% |
This is the instrument to understand. You signed it at an $8M cap — but it carries a most-favoured-nation clause, which entitles it to the best terms you granted anyone. Your lead angel's $6M cap is better. So the syndicate does not convert at its own $8M cap; the MFN pulls it down to the $6M cap price ($0.4681).
| At its own $8M cap | With MFN → $6M cap | |
|---|---|---|
| Conversion price | $0.6242 | $0.4681 |
| Shares | ~480,700 | 640,941 |
| % of post | ~3.07% | 4.09% |
| Difference | — | +~160,200 shares · +1.02 pts |
Roughly a full percentage point of the company moves from you to the syndicate — and you triggered it yourself the moment you signed the lead's cheaper $6M SAFE. This is the number a raw calculator shows only if you already knew to look for it.
Modeled by comparing the base-case conversion with the MFN active vs. the same instrument fixed at its own $8M cap. Confirm the MFN's exact scope (which instruments qualify, timing cutoffs) against the executed document with counsel — MFN definitions vary.
Your runway extender, and the only instrument in your stack with no cap. It converts at 20% off the round price: base-case round price $1.4042 × (1 − 0.20) = $1.1233. Because it has no cap, its dilution is entirely a function of the price you set — it is the moving target in your stack.
| Scenario | Round price | Conv. price (−20%) | Shares | % of post |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $0.9325 | $0.7460 | 536,193 | 3.33% |
| Base | $1.4042 | $1.1233 | 356,078 | 2.27% |
| Bull | $2.0422 | $1.6337 | 244,839 | 1.64% |
Uncapped SAFEs are the single hardest instrument to model by hand, because share count and round price are mutually dependent — the engine solves that circularity directly (see methodology). This is the line most DIY spreadsheets get wrong or leave blank.
Your one debt instrument. Unlike a SAFE, a note accrues interest that converts into equity too: 6% simple × 14/12 months = $17,500, so it converts on $267,500, not $250,000. It's capped at $10M, which governs (cheaper than the round price), giving a conversion price of $0.7801.
| Term | Value |
|---|---|
| Principal | $250,000 |
| Simple interest (6% × 14/12) | $17,500 |
| Converting amount | $267,500 |
| Cap | $10,000,000 |
| Cap-implied price/share | $0.7801 |
| Converts on | Cap |
| Shares | 342,904 |
| Ownership, post-round | 2.19% |
Every convertible instrument is really an option on two prices: the cap-implied price and the discount-implied price. The investor takes the lower one; you pay the difference. Seeing which rule governs each instrument — and by how much — is how you understand what your early terms actually cost.
| Instrument | Cap price | Discount price | Round price | Winner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead angel | $0.4681 | — | $1.4042 | Cap |
| Syndicate (MFN) | $0.4681 | — | $1.4042 | Cap (via MFN) |
| Bridge | — | $1.1233 | $1.4042 | Discount |
| Note | $0.7801 | — | $1.4042 | Cap |
Ownership fixed vs. the post-money cap table. Nearly indifferent to the round price. These are your locked-in blocks — you manage them by structure (MFN, pool), not by pre-money.
Ownership floats with the round price. Cheaper to you when you price high, costlier when you price low. This is your one scenario-sensitive line.
Why this matters to you now: §1 and §2 gave you percentages; a lead's diligence wants shares, reconciling to a round number, signed off by you. This is the table you paste into your data room. Base case ($18M pre), every holder, exact share count, summing to 100.00%.
| Holder | FD shares | Ownership | $ value @ post |
|---|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 8,400,000 | 53.61% | $11.53M |
| Existing pool + team | 800,000 | 5.11% | $1.10M |
| Option pool (new top-up) | 1,566,745 | 10.00% | $2.15M |
| Lead angel SAFE | 1,068,235 | 6.82% | $1.47M |
| Syndicate SAFE (MFN) | 640,941 | 4.09% | $0.88M |
| Bridge SAFE (uncapped) | 356,078 | 2.27% | $0.49M |
| Convertible note (angel) | 342,904 | 2.19% | $0.47M |
| New round investors | 2,492,549 | 15.91% | $3.50M |
| Total | 15,667,454 | 100.00% | $21.50M |
$ value = ownership × $21.5M post-money — a valuation-implied figure, not a liquidation estimate (which would depend on preferences; see §4 and the note on liquidation stacking). Total FD shares 15,667,454; price/share $1.4042.
The most misunderstood line on your waterfall is the 1,566,745-share new option pool. Here's the mechanic leads rely on you not fully grasping: a new pool "sized to 10% post-money" is created in the pre-money, which means you and your converting SAFEs pay for it — the new investor does not.
"It's a company pool — everyone shares it, including the new investor."
Reality: no.
Founders + existing holders + your converting SAFEs absorb the entire 10%. The new investor's 15.91% is calculated after the pool already exists.
Put concretely: that pool is $2.15M of your post-money value, and essentially none of it comes from the new investor. It is the single largest founder-recoverable line in your entire round — larger than the MFN cost, larger than any single SAFE.
The same holders, all three pre-money scenarios, so you can see who is scenario-sensitive and who is locked. This is the table to have open when the lead asks "what if we come in at a different number?"
| Holder | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| Founders (2) | 52.22% | 53.61% | 56.24% |
| Existing pool + team | 4.97% | 5.11% | 5.36% |
| New option pool | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% |
| Lead angel SAFE | 6.67% | 6.82% | 7.10% |
| Syndicate SAFE (MFN) | 4.00% | 4.09% | 4.26% |
| Bridge SAFE | 3.33% | 2.27% | 1.64% |
| Convertible note | 2.14% | 2.19% | 2.28% |
| New investors | 16.67% | 15.91% | 13.11% |
| Total | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
The pool holds at exactly 10% by construction; the two capped SAFEs and the note barely move (±0.4 pt).
The bridge SAFE (3.33%→1.64%) and the new investors (16.67%→13.11%) are the only lines that meaningfully swing.
Founders track the new-investor line inversely: every point the new investor gives up, you keep.
Read the pattern: the pre-money you negotiate is essentially a two-party trade between you and the new investor, with the bridge SAFE as the only prior instrument along for the ride. Everything else is fixed.
You started owning 100% of 9,200,000 existing shares. After this round you hold 58.72% (founders + team, base case). Here is exactly where the other ~41 points went — so when a co-founder asks "why are we at 59%?", you have the line-by-line answer.
Each bar is that holder's % of the post-round company; together they're the 41.28% you no longer hold. Founders + team retain the balance (58.72%).
The waterfall above is ownership by fully-diluted share — the right lens for control and for how a lead prices your round. It is not the same as who gets paid what in an exit, because your new preferred investors will hold a liquidation preference (typically 1× non-participating at seed).
| Lens | What it answers | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| Fully-diluted % | Control, dilution, how the lead prices the round | This report (§1–§3) |
| As-converted payout | Who gets what in a sale, given preferences | Your counsel's model / Boardroom tier |
Bottom line: use these ownership figures for the round negotiation and your data room. For "what do I net in a $200M sale," bring your signed term sheet to counsel or to the Boardroom tier.
Why this matters to you now: the numbers so far are neutral. This section is our opinion, computed from your stack: the specific ways your instruments convert to more dilution than founders usually expect. Each is a pattern flag on your inputs, ranked by severity — not a legal conclusion. Confirm each against your executed documents.
Detailed on page 25. The syndicate's MFN inherited your lead's $6M cap, adding ~160,000 shares. It also constrains every future SAFE you issue.
Detailed on page 26. Post-money SAFE percentages are additive against you; your capped pre-seed SAFEs alone are 6.82% + 4.09% = 10.9% of post before the round prices.
Detailed on page 27. The bridge is invisible in a static cap table; it swings from 3.33% (bear) to 1.64% (bull).
Detailed on page 28. A material block first-time founders under-count; a lead prices the whole stack into a lower pre-money if you don't bring the number.
Detailed on page 29. Founder-friendly in a strong round, but offers the investor no downside protection — a lead may ask to cap it.
What it is. Your syndicate SAFE ($300K, $8M cap) carries a most-favoured-nation clause: it automatically adopts the most investor-favourable terms you grant anyone before it converts. When you later signed the lead's $6M-cap SAFE, the MFN reached over and took that $6M cap.
What it cost. ~160,000 shares moved to the syndicate; founder ownership dropped ~1 full point (see page 15 for the side-by-side). At a $21.5M post-money that's roughly $215,000 of value transferred by a clause most founders wave through as "standard."
The forward-looking danger. The MFN doesn't just cost you once. Every future SAFE you issue with a better cap or discount is inherited by the syndicate too — so it caps your pricing flexibility for the rest of your pre-priced-round fundraising.
Modeled from your stated $6M / $8M caps and the MFN flag. Executed-document MFN definitions vary (some exclude notes, some have look-back limits) — verify before relying on this figure.
What it is. The defining trap of the post-money SAFE. Each one's ownership is fixed as a percentage of the post-money cap table. So when you stack several, the percentages don't dilute each other — they add, and every point comes straight out of founders and the pool.
| Instrument | % of post-money cap table |
|---|---|
| Lead angel ($500K ÷ $6M cap) | 8.33% |
| Syndicate ($300K ÷ $6M via MFN) | 5.00% |
| Bridge (discount, uncapped) | ~2.8% |
| Additive prior-stack ownership | ~16.1% of post-money cap table |
Why founders miss it. The intuition "I gave each angel a small slice" is wrong for post-money SAFEs. Two $500K SAFEs at a $10M cap are not "about 5% together" — they're 5% + 5% = 10%, because the second one doesn't dilute the first; you do.
What it is. Your $400K bridge SAFE has no cap — only a 20% discount. Its share of the company is undefined until you set a price, which makes it invisible in any static cap table and a genuine unknown in your planning.
| If you price at… | Bridge takes | Effect on you |
|---|---|---|
| $12M pre (bear) | 3.33% | Costliest — low price, discount bites |
| $18M pre (base) | 2.27% | Middle |
| $26M pre (bull) | 1.64% | Cheapest — high price shrinks it |
Why it's flagged medium, not high. It's founder-friendly when you win (bull case), and $400K at a 20% discount is a modest block. But it's a real uncertainty in a soft market, and — importantly — it's the term a next-round lead most dislikes inheriting, because they can't cleanly model an unpriced block in their own cap table.
The bridge is the instrument most DIY spreadsheets model wrong, because its share count and the round price are mutually dependent — a circular solve the engine handles directly.
What it is. Your prior stack converts to 15.37% of post in the base case. That's the number a lead computes first — and then quietly reprices your pre-money to account for it. If you don't bring this number, the lead is the one who introduces it, from a position of information advantage.
Right at the ~15% level our benchmark (§5) flags as the threshold where a lead starts trimming the pre-money. You are exactly at the line where this stops being background and starts being a negotiation input.
Why founders under-count it. SAFEs aren't shares until they convert, so they don't appear on the cap table you look at every day. The block is real, it's large, and it's the single most common source of "wait, I own less than I thought" at a priced round.
What it is. The bridge SAFE's 20% discount, with no cap, is the founder-friendlier structure when your round is strong — but it gives the investor no downside protection. That asymmetry is worth understanding because it shapes how a lead reacts to it.
You price high. A 20% discount off a strong round price is far less dilutive than a low cap would have been. In your bull case the bridge is only 1.64%.
A lead asking to convert it to a cap, or an investor who feels under-protected wanting a cap added retroactively. Neither is automatic, but both come up.
This is a low-severity flag because it's not costing you today and may help you — it's here so you understand the instrument's shape and aren't surprised if a lead raises it.
| Flag | Severity | Action window |
|---|---|---|
| MFN backward-flow | High | Before term sheet — counsel |
| Additive SAFE stack | High | Before next SAFE — model first |
| Uncapped bridge | Medium | Before term sheet — decide cap |
| ~15% block a lead prices | Medium | At the negotiation — bring §1–3 |
| Discount-only economics | Low | Awareness — no action needed |
A warning map is only credible if it also tells you where you're clean. On your stack, these common traps are absent:
Absence of a flag is not a legal opinion that the risk doesn't exist — only that your reported inputs didn't trigger it. Your counsel reviews the documents; we model the numbers.
Why this matters to you now: knowing your own numbers is half the battle; knowing whether they're normal is the other half. When an angel asks "why is my ownership so large?" or a lead says "your terms are aggressive," you want to answer from the distribution, not from a feeling. Directional medians from public sources — verify the current quarter before quoting.
| Typical seed raise | $2M–$4M (median deal ≈ $3–4M) |
| Typical cap / valuation | $12M–$20M post-money cap (or priced ≈ $16M pre / $24M post, per Carta) |
| Instrument norm | Post-money SAFE (cap-only) or a priced round; 20% is the standard discount when one is used at all |
| Median dilution | ≈ 18–22% given up in a seed round |
| Option pool | 10–15% post-money, commonly demanded in the pre-money |
Sources: Carta, State of Private Markets; PitchBook-NVCA Venture Monitor; Y Combinator Post-Money SAFE User Guide; Cooley GO deal-terms surveys. Figures are directional medians reported across 2024–2026, given as ranges. Verify the current quarter before quoting.
Your stack against the seed market, line by line — with the sentence you can say when each comes up.
| Your number | You | Seed range | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base raise | $3.5M | $2–4M | Mid-range — unremarkable, good |
| Base pre-money | $18M | $16M pre (median) | Slightly above median — defensible |
| Lead SAFE cap | $6M | $12–20M | Below seed — it's a pre-seed cap |
| Syndicate cap | $8M | $12–20M | Below seed — pre-seed cap |
| Note cap | $10M | $12–20M | Just below seed range |
| Prior-stack dilution | 15.4% | 18–22% (full seed) | Below, because this is the SAFE block only |
To put your 15.4% in context, here's how a SAFE-stacked company typically dilutes across its early life. It helps you see where you are and what's coming.
| Stage | Typical raise | Typical cap | Dilution given up |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-seed | $0.5–1.5M | $6–12M | ≈ 10–15% |
| Seed (you) | $2–4M | $12–20M | ≈ 18–22% |
| Series A | $8–15M | priced, $40–80M post | ≈ 18–20% + converting stack |
Ranges are directional medians across 2024–2026 public sources; your reality depends on your executed terms and market conditions at your raise. This ladder is context, not a forecast.
Because your pool is your single biggest recoverable line (§3.1), it's worth benchmarking on its own. "10–15% post-money in the pre-money" is the reflexive ask — but "market" is more nuanced than a single number.
Meridian is an AI care-coordination company, so a word on the premium. Through 2025–26, AI-native companies carried a reported valuation premium — median AI early-stage valuations ran well above non-AI comps.
We publish these figures as ranges, refreshed quarterly, and tell you to verify the current quarter before quoting — because a benchmark presented as false precision is worse than none. The methodology page lists the exact vintage of each figure used in your report.
Why this matters to you now: the fastest way to lose points is to be surprised. This section is illustrative scenario modeling — the terms in your stack a priced-round lead most commonly re-opens at seed, so you can pre-empt them. It is not negotiation coaching and not advice; it's "here's what tends to come up, and here's your number for it."
| What the lead raises | Your exposure | Your pre-loaded answer |
|---|---|---|
| "Your SAFE overhang is heavy" | 15.37% | §3 waterfall — exact, reconciled |
| "We need a 10–15% pool" | $2.15M | §3.1/5.3 — hiring-plan sizing + post-money placement |
| "That uncapped SAFE is a problem" | 2.27% (base) | §2.3/4.3 — you've already decided cap-or-not |
| "Let's talk preferences" | new term | Resist >1× / participating (5.5) |
What's happening. The lead models your entire prior stack converting (15.37%), sees a heavy block, and reduces the pre-money they'll offer so their own post-money ownership lands where they want it. This is standard and rational — they price the whole cap table, not just their entry.
Why you can hold your ground. The overhang is fixed whether or not the lead mentions it — so a pre-money "adjustment for overhang" is partly the lead pricing something that exists regardless. Knowing your exact 15.37% (and that 3 of 4 instruments are cap-locked and won't grow) lets you distinguish a fair adjustment from an over-correction.
This is illustrative modeling of a common negotiation dynamic, not a recommendation about what to say or accept. Your counsel and your own judgment govern the actual negotiation.
What's happening. The lead asks for a fresh pool sized to post-money but created in the pre-money — so you and your SAFEs fund it, not them. It's the most reliable point-grab in a seed term sheet precisely because founders accept it reflexively.
Your two levers (both quantified earlier): size it to your hiring plan (§5.3), and negotiate its placement (§3.1). A 5% pool instead of 10% frees ~845,000 shares (the pool itself shrinks from 1,566,745 to ~721,900); moving it post-money shares the dilution with the lead.
What's happening. A next-round lead dislikes inheriting an unpriced block they can't cleanly model. They may ask you to convert the bridge to a cap before or at the round, so it's a known quantity in their table.
Your position. You've already run the scenarios (§2.3): the bridge is 2.27% at base, cheaper if you price high. If the lead wants a cap, you know exactly what cap leaves you neutral vs. leaving it uncapped — so you can agree to a fair one rather than a defensive over-correction. And you'll have (per Part 3, lever 3) already spoken to the bridge investor, so you're not renegotiating three-way under time pressure.
Whether to cap an uncapped instrument is a real economic decision with two-sided investor impact — model it and take counsel before committing. This page shows the shape of the conversation, not the answer.
Everything above is your existing stack. But the priced round introduces new terms your SAFEs never had: the liquidation preference, participation, anti-dilution, board and protective provisions. These aren't in your inputs (they don't exist yet), so we can't model them — but you should walk in knowing the market defaults.
| Term | Market default (seed) | Push back if… |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidation preference | 1× non-participating | Participating or >1× proposed |
| Anti-dilution | Broad-based weighted avg | Full-ratchet proposed |
| Option pool | 10–15%, negotiate placement | >15% or all pre-money |
| Board | Founder-friendly / balanced | Investor control at seed |
End of the analysis core. Part 3 turns all of this into a transformation: what changes if you act on it.
Everything so far diagnosed. This part is the transformation: the before/after picture, the specific levers that move your number, a milestone timeline, and how your next lead conversation actually changes. This is what "good" looks like eight weeks from now.
A folder of SAFE PDFs and a share count.
Can't answer "send your as-converted table."
Don't know the MFN cost you a point.
Pre-money floated at you; can't counter.
Pool ask coming; don't know who pays.
A reconciled as-converted table, three scenarios.
You send it before the associate asks twice.
You've quantified and flagged the MFN for counsel.
You counter the pre-money from the model.
You size the pool to your hiring plan.
The gap this report closes isn't primarily percentage points (though the pool and MFN levers below are worth several). It's the shift from negotiating blind to negotiating from the same model the lead is using. That shift is what repriced term sheets are made of.
The next four pages take the four levers in your control — the pool, the MFN, the bridge, and the pre-money — and show the concrete before/after of acting on each.
Not every lever is worth the same. Here they are ordered by how many points they can plausibly return to the founders' block — so you spend your negotiating capital where it pays.
*Bridge value is scenario-dependent (bear vs. bull). Pre-money's ~4.4 pts is the full bear→bull founder swing, but it trades against the new investor and is the hardest-fought; the pool and MFN are more reliably recoverable because they're structural, not valuation.
The next pages take levers 1–3 individually. Lever 4 (pre-money) is your standard valuation negotiation — §1 gives you the founder ownership at every pre-money so you can price the trade-off in real time.
The single largest recoverable line in your round. You're modeling a 10% pool (1,566,745 shares, $2.15M) created entirely in your pre-money. Here's what happens if you size it to a leaner-but-realistic 5% hiring plan instead:
New pool: 1,566,745 shares
Founders + team: 58.72%
Pool value: $2.15M, all yours
New pool: ~721,900 shares
Founders + team: ~63.7%
~845,000 shares recovered
Both figures engine-computed: the base scenario re-run at a 5% target pool vs. 10%, all else equal. The founders' % rises because a smaller pre-money pool means less dilution absorbed by you and your SAFEs.
Don't under-size to a number you'll blow through in six months and have to top up in a dilutive way — the goal is right-sized, matched to a real plan, not merely small.
The clause that already cost you ~1 point. The syndicate's MFN pulled it to the lead's $6M cap. You can't un-sign it, but you can stop it from costing you more and understand exactly where it lands.
Syndicate at $6M cap: 4.09%
Founders + team: 58.72%
Any future cheaper SAFE flows to it too
Syndicate at $8M cap: ~3.07%
Founders + team: ~59.7%
~160,000 shares back to founders
The "after" is the engine re-run with the MFN inactive (syndicate held to its own $8M cap) — an illustration of the clause's cost, not a promise you can remove it. Whether the MFN can be renegotiated depends on your documents and the investor.
Turn an unknown into a decision. The uncapped bridge is the one instrument whose dilution you don't yet control. You can't make it disappear, but you can decide its shape on your timeline instead of under term-sheet pressure.
| Choice | Bridge outcome | When it's right |
|---|---|---|
| Leave uncapped | 2.27% base · 1.64% bull · 3.33% bear | You expect a strong round; you want max upside |
| Cap it now (with investor) | Fixed, predictable % | You want certainty; you fear a soft market; the lead will demand it anyway |
Capping an uncapped instrument changes the economics for the bridge investor too — it's a negotiation, not a unilateral move. Model both sides and take counsel before proposing terms.
The standard fight, transformed by knowing your number. This is the negotiation everyone focuses on. What changes with this report is that you can price every pre-money offer in real time — you know the founder ownership at $12M, $18M, $26M, and anywhere between.
| If the lead offers… | You end at (founders+team) | New investor gets |
|---|---|---|
| $12M pre | 57.19% | 16.67% |
| $18M pre | 58.72% | 15.91% |
| $26M pre | 61.60% | 13.11% |
Combine the levers: the pool (lever 1) and pre-money (lever 4) interact. A slightly lower pre-money with a leaner post-money pool can leave you better off than a higher pre-money with a fat pre-money pool. The model lets you find that trade — the lead is already running it on their side.
What if you pulled the reliable levers together: right-size the pool to 5–6% and place a portion post-money, hold the pre-money at a defensible $18M, and resolve the bridge? Illustratively, the founders' block moves from the mid-50s toward the low-60s — driven mostly by the pool.
10% pre-money pool
MFN unmanaged
Founders + team: 58.72%
5% pool, partly post-money
MFN priced & stopped compounding
Founders + team: ~63–64%
The ~63.7% figure is the engine's base scenario re-run at a 5% pool; the "partly post-money" and MFN effects are directional and depend on what you actually negotiate. This is an illustration of the levers' combined shape, not a guaranteed outcome.
Beyond the negotiation, this report changes how prepared you look — and diligence speed correlates with perceived preparedness. Here's the before/after of the artifacts you hand over.
| Diligence request | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| As-converted cap table | "Give me a few days" | §3, sent same day |
| Scenario sensitivity | Not available | §1, three scenarios ready |
| SAFE terms summary | Folder of PDFs | §2, one clean table |
| "Any unusual terms?" | Hope not | §4, you raise them first |
None of this replaces your counsel's legal review or your accountant's sign-off. It makes those conversations faster and better-informed, because you arrive with the numbers already modeled and the questions already framed.
The transformation above is real, but let's be precise about its boundaries — because a report that over-promises is worse than useless in a room full of professional investors.
Part 4 makes the clarity actionable: exactly what to do this week, in 30 days, and in 90 days, plus the scripts and handoff sheet.
The milestone timeline from where you are today to a closed round — with this report as the spine. Eight weeks, illustrative; compress or stretch to your reality.
Zooming into Weeks 0–2, the prep that determines how the negotiation goes. Each item ties to a report section, so nothing here is abstract.
| Milestone | Ties to | Done when… |
|---|---|---|
| You can state your as-converted % from memory | §1, p.4 | "15.37% at base" is automatic |
| Hiring plan built (for pool ask) | Lever 1, p.43 | Roster → shares → % on one page |
| MFN scope confirmed with counsel | §4 #1, p.25 | You know if it's already fixed |
| Bridge-cap decision made | Lever 3, p.45 | Uncapped-on-purpose or cap agreed |
| Data room has §2 + §3 | p.13, p.19 | Terms table + waterfall uploaded |
| Co-founder aligned on the number | §3.3, p.22 | You both can explain where points went |
Good round economics don't end at close. Here's what "good" looks like at 30, 60, and 90 days out — so this report seeds habits, not just one negotiation.
A responsible roadmap names its own risks. Here's what could derail the transformation, and how to keep it on track.
| Risk | Likelihood | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Executed docs differ from your summary | Medium | Counsel reads the originals against §2/§4 before you rely on figures |
| MFN already irrevocably triggered | Medium | Confirm scope early (p.25); if fixed, at least stop it compounding |
| Soft market → lower pre-money | Varies | You have the bear case (p.10) modeled; no surprises |
| Lead holds firm on 10% pre-money pool | Medium | Trade it against pre-money (lever 1×4); you know the math |
| Note maturity forces early conversion | Low | Confirm maturity date on the note (§2.4) with counsel now |
The concrete before/after of the single most important meeting in your raise. Same lead, same terms — different you, because you walked in with this report.
It's not just the lead. Your existing angels will have questions when they see the priced round — especially the syndicate whose MFN made their ownership look large. This report lets you handle those gracefully instead of defensively.
If an angel disputes a figure, that's exactly the moment to loop in counsel and reconcile against executed documents — the report is your starting model, not the final legal word.
Dilution isn't only an investor conversation. Your co-founder and early employees care deeply about the option pool and their own dilution. This report gives you the shared, honest picture to have that conversation well.
Close your eyes on the version of this raise where you did the work. It's Week 8. The round has closed.
None of that required you to become a finance expert. It required one thing: knowing your own numbers before anyone else in the room did. That's what this report is.
For $390 and an evening of reading. The alternative — winging it — costs points you'll never see leave, in a negotiation you only run once at this stage.
You now have the full picture: your number (Part 1), the analysis behind it (Part 2), and what changes when you act (Part 3). Desire without action is just anxiety. So Part 4 is deliberately concrete — no more concepts, only a to-do list you can start tonight.
The 4–5 things that must happen before your next lead call. Page 59.
The negotiation and data-room moves. Page 60.
Closing clean and building the discipline. Page 61.
Plus: scripts you can adapt and send tomorrow (p.62), a one-page handoff sheet for your lawyer and CPA (p.65), and where deeper modeling makes sense (p.67).
No concepts, just moves. Ordered by urgency. Check them off.
If you do nothing else from the checklist, do these two. Between them they capture the large majority of the recoverable value in your round.
Why: ~5 points, ~$1M, least-contested line. How: a one-page hiring roster → shares → 5–6% ask + post-money placement. When: before the term sheet. Ties to: lever 1 (p.43), §5.3.
Why: confirms your MFN/bridge/note figures against executed docs, so you rely on numbers that are real. How: 30 min + the handoff sheet (p.65). When: this week. Ties to: §4, §6.4.
Move 1 recovers the value; Move 2 makes sure the value is real. Everything else in this report supports, sharpens, or defends these two. Start here tonight.
This prioritization is illustrative guidance based on your modeled numbers, not a recommendation to take or forgo any specific action — your counsel and judgment govern.
Print this. It's every number you need in the room, on one page, so you never fumble for a figure mid-conversation.
| You need to know… | Base ($18M pre) | Section |
|---|---|---|
| Founders + team, post-round | 58.72% | §1 / §3 |
| Prior stack, as-converted | 15.37% | §1 |
| New option pool cost | 10% = $2.15M | §3.1 |
| MFN cost to you | ~1 pt / ~$215K | §2.2 / §4.1 |
| Bridge SAFE (scenario range) | 1.64%–3.33% | §2.3 |
| Founders at $12M / $18M / $26M | 57.2 / 58.7 / 61.6% | §1 |
| Pool trimmed to 5% → founders | ~63.7% | Lever 1 |
| New-round preference to resist | >1× / participating | §6.4 |
Editable starting points — not scripts to read verbatim. Make them yours; the goal is that the numbers are accurate and the framing is confident.
Every script above encodes a real figure from this report. Update the bracketed numbers if your intake changes; the framing holds.
| Role | Target equity | ≈ shares |
|---|---|---|
| VP Eng | 1.0% | [fill] |
| Sr. Engineers ×3 | 0.3% ea | [fill] |
| Head of Sales | 0.75% | [fill] |
| Early hires ×4 | 0.15% ea | [fill] |
| Total needed | ≈ 3.85% | [sum] |
Fill with your real roster. The total is your evidence-based pool ask — usually well under a reflexive 10%.
| Instrument | Cap | Disc | MFN | Note terms | Modeled? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [each SAFE/note] | [$] | [%] | [y/n] | [rate/age/maturity] | [✓ before signing] |
Tear this out (or forward it). It routes exactly the questions this report can't answer — the ones that need your executed documents and a professional's judgment — so your counsel call is fast and focused.
If your entire stack is consolidated on Carta or AngelList, they model conversion for free — and you should use them. This report is for founders whose stack isn't cleanly on one tool (like this fictional one, with two pre-Carta SAFEs and a loose PDF), or who want the interpretation layer: the warning map, the benchmark, the "what a lead re-opens," and the roadmap. We differentiate on the reading, not the arithmetic.
The arithmetic is deterministic standard cap-table algebra (YC post-money SAFE mechanics + classic dilution), the same inputs always producing the same numbers. It's analytical modeling you bring to the table — not a legal opinion or valuation. It makes your conversation with counsel and the lead faster and better-informed; it doesn't replace either.
Re-run it. Your report regenerates deterministically from your intake — new instrument, new scenario, updated cap, and every figure recomputes consistently. That's the point of an engine over a one-off spreadsheet.
This report models your SAFE/note conversion into a priced round — the highest-value, most-under-modeled part of a seed raise. Two natural extensions, framed honestly as "when you actually need them," not upsell for its own sake:
Once you have a term sheet, adds an exit-waterfall layer (who nets what given the actual preferences), plus up to 5 portfolio companies for accelerators/syndicates and a 30-min walkthrough. This is where liquidation modeling (§3.4) becomes possible, because the preferences finally exist.
If you also need the fundraise-readiness picture — narrative, materials, investor-targeting — RaiseReady covers it, and this round-economics report is its $290 add-on. Buy this standalone if dilution is your only question.
| Post-money SAFE | The YC Nov-2018 instrument. Investor ownership is fixed as investment ÷ post-money cap, measured on the post-money (post-SAFE, pre-new-round) cap table. Later SAFEs and the pool dilute founders, not other post-money SAFEs. |
| Pre-money SAFE | The legacy instrument; converts on the pre-money valuation, so SAFEs dilute each other. Harder to model; you reported none. |
| Valuation cap | A ceiling on the price at which a SAFE converts — the lower the cap, the more shares the investor gets. Cap-implied price = cap ÷ pre-money fully-diluted shares. |
| Discount | A fixed % off the round price. The investor takes whichever of cap-price or discount-price yields more shares (the lower price). |
| MFN | Most-favoured-nation. The holder inherits the best terms you grant anyone before conversion. In your stack it pulled the syndicate SAFE to the lead's lower cap. |
| Option-pool shuffle | Creating a new option pool in the pre-money, so founders and converting SAFEs — not the new investor — absorb its dilution. |
| Fully diluted | All shares as if every option, SAFE, and note has converted. The right basis for ownership and control (vs. issued-and-outstanding). |
| Liquidation preference | A priced-round preferred term: what investors get back first in a sale. 1× non-participating is the seed standard. Not in your SAFE stack; arrives with the term sheet. |
Definitions are practitioner shorthand for this report, not legal definitions. Your executed documents and counsel govern the operative meanings.
Every figure in this report is computed by a deterministic engine — the same inputs always produce the same outputs — implementing standard startup-finance algebra re-derived from first principles: YC post-money SAFE mechanics, classic priced-round dilution, cap-vs-discount selection, MFN resolution, simple note interest, and the pre-money option-pool shuffle. The one genuinely hard part — post-money SAFE shares and the round price are mutually dependent — is solved with a direct fixpoint, including the uncapped-discount instrument. The engine is verified by an automated test suite (post-money SAFE = principal/cap of the post-money cap table; stacked post-money SAFEs are additive; the waterfall sums to 100%; MFN inherits the lowest cap; note interest = 6% simple × months/12).
Benchmark figures are directional medians reported across 2024–2026, published as ranges and refreshed quarterly. Verify the current quarter before quoting any figure in a live negotiation. Full methodology at roundeconomics.com/methodology.
This report is analytical modeling of the numbers you provided. It is not investment, legal, tax, or accounting advice, not a valuation opinion, and not a securities recommendation. Figures are derived solely from your stated inputs and standard cap-table algebra; they are not warranted for accuracy or fitness for any transaction.
SAFE/note conversion depends on the exact executed documents, which can contain terms (seniority, pro-rata side letters, MFN scope and definitions, conversion triggers, maturity dates) that change the outcome and that this engine cannot see. Have your own securities counsel and accountant verify every figure before you sign any term sheet, SAFE, or financing document.
RoundEconomics is not a broker-dealer, investment adviser, or law firm. It does not introduce investors, solicit securities transactions, or receive success fees. It provides flat-fee analytical research reports only. Illustrative negotiation framings in §6 and Part 3 are scenario modeling, not coaching or advice about what to say or accept — your counsel and judgment govern any negotiation.
The company, people, valuations, and identifiers in this sample ("Meridian Health," meridian-demo.com) are fictional and for illustration only. Any resemblance to a real company is coincidental. The figures are engine-computed from the fictional inputs on page 6.
Enter your founders' shares, your actual SAFE/note stack, and the scenarios you're weighing. Every figure re-derived from your numbers. No success fee, no equity, no investor introductions.
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